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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELSA B. MICHAEL, and BEVERLY 
S. CLENDEJ\Tl\' and ELSA B. MI-
CHAEL, Trustees of a trust for the 
use and benefi.t of HELEN B. BEHAL, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, ! 
Case No. 
( 9034 
SALT LAKE INVESTMENT COM-
pANY, an expired Utah corporation, 
and SALT LAKE INVESTMENT ) COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Dejenda11ts and Appellants. / 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' statement of facts, although it contains but 
few recitations inconsistent with the record, is so incomplete 
that it may tend to mislead. Accordingly, it is controverted 
generally, and the following statement is offered. 
This is an action to quiet title relative to realt} situate in 
Salt Lake County, to-wit: 
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Lots 22 to 27 indusive,1 Folsom's Addition to Salt 
Lake City, Utah, excepting therefrom a right-of-way 
for the Bamberger Electric Railroad as now constructed 
through Lots 22 and 23 of said block and addition. 
(R. 1, 9, 10). 
Respondents claim record Iitle and title by adverse possession 
(R. 9). Appellants denied plaintiffs' titles generally and 
asserted a tax deed but did not counterdaim; at the trial 
they introduced no exhibits and made but one abortive attempt 
at direct examination (R. 9, 79, 86-87). 
On June 20, 1882, and therafter until March 22, 1898, 
the legal title owners of the subject realty were William H. 
Folsom and Hyrum P. Folsom, tenants in common (Ex. 1, 
pp. 1-19). On the latter date, the Folsoms and their wives 
warranted title to Simon Bamberger (Ex. 1, p. 19}. This 
legal title is now held by respondents (Ex. 1, pp. 20-28). 
On Febmary 3, 1897, the land was purportedly sold to 
M. C. Moon, predecessor of appellants, for delinquent taxes 
for the year 1896, which the record of sale recites were assessed 
in the name of W. H. Folsom; the consideration paid was 
$8.62 (Ex. 1, p. 11). The property was deeded to "The Salt 
Lake Investment_ Company" on September 22, 1909 (F.x. R). 
The company's corporate charter expired on March 3, 1953; 
no distribution of the subject realty took place (R. 10). 
Taxes for the year 1896 in fact had been assessed against 
"W. H. Folsom eta!." (R. 83); the same description of the 
owners of the land appeared in the regularly published de-
linquent list for the year (Ex. 9). The record of sale to M. C. 
Moon, however. described the taxes a~ assessed against"\\'. H. 
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folsom" (Ex.l, p. 11), as did the auditor's deed (.Ex. 8, p. 3). 
The owners' post office address does not appear in the assess-
ment roll (R. 83). The assessment was listed in Book B of 
the 1896 Assessment Roll, to which there was appended no 
affidavit whatever (-R. 81). Book D, the linal book of such 
roll, had appended to it a form of auditor"s certificate, but 
it was not subscribed and was without jurat (R. 81, 82). 
Neither the 1896 Assessment Roll, the pertinent delinquent 
list, nor the auditor" s deed noted that the described realty 
was within the municipal limits of Salt Lake City, Utah. {Ex. 
1, p. 9; R. 82-85; Ex. 9; Ex. 8, p. 3). 
Taxes assessed against the property for 1897 and 1!!98 
were not paid and the property was struck off to Salt Lake 
County at tax sale (Ex. 1, p. 18). By qmt-claim deed dated 
May 7, 1906, Salt Lake County conveyed its interest to Simon 
Bamberger, the deed reciting that it was "made under the 
authority of Section 2655 of the Revised Statutes of Utah, 
1898, and as amended by the Session Laws of 1905, and in 
pursuance of an order of the Board of County Commissioners 
of said Salt Lake County, made the 7th day of May, 1906" 
(Ex. 2). The minutes of the Board of County Commissioners 
appears as Exhibit 3. The title thus obtained by Governor 
Ram berger is now held by respondents (Ex. I, pp. 22-30). 
From at least 1924 until the present, taxes on the property 
have been paid by or on behalf of respondents and their 
predecessors in title (R. 29; Ex. 6), Such payments were 
timely, and the taxes were never delinquent (R. 29-30). 
From at least 1917 until the present the subject realty 
has been occupied and its ownership claimed by the Bam-
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• 
berger family, their business enterprises, and their tenants 
(R. 17-20, 23-25, 52; Ex. 1, pp. 19, 20, 23, 26, 27). These 
included Simon and Ida M. Bamberger, respondents, Bam-
berger Railroad, Bamberger Electric Railroad Company, Simon 
Bamberger Company and Lagoon Company (R. 17-20, 23-25). 
In 1917, the property was in a predominately rural neighbor-
hood, with some industry, a few residences and a great deal of 
vacant land (R. 21). The neighborhood has evolved into a 
more intensively industrialized section (R. 22, 62). 
From at least 1917 until approximately 1935 the subject 
realty was occupied by a railroad tie yard (R. 24, 34). It was 
continuously used and was conducted by the Bamberger :Electric 
Railroad Company (R. 20, 22-23), one of the Bamberger 
intere;;ts, with the permission of and in subordination to Simon 
and Ida M. Bamberger and Simon Bamberger Company (R. 
23-25). During this period the lots in que;;tion were covered 
by piles of ties which averaged 8 feet in height and 8 feet 
square (R. 24-26). In order that persons might remove and 
manipulate ties, a corridor approximating 10 feet in width 
was maintained between piles. Lots 22 through 26 are 25 feet 
by 125 feet, except as reduced in size by the railroad right· 
of-way; lot 27 is somewhat larger (R. 24-25, 57; Ex. 4). 
Use of the land as a tie yard was so intensive that another 
use could not be conducted thereon (R. 46), and that neighbor· 
ing landowners complained that ties on lot 27, easternmost 
from the railroad_ (Ex. 4), were encroaching upon an alley 
then open, bordering lots 26 and 27 to the northeast (R. 2'i. 
34; Ex. 4). Chestnut Street was also open (R. 25). A survey 
of the property "as conducted by Chief Engineer Vale of the 
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Bamberger interests (R. 33). A ""no trespass" sign was main-
tained (R. 40). 
In about 1935 the Bamberger interests began to restrict 
their use of the realty because their tenants, Wen dell and 
Donald H. Wagstaff, had use for it; and as the tie piles 
diminished, Bamberger Electric Railroad did not replenish 
them, but moved their operation to lots 1-7 to the south (R. 3·1· 
35, 46). 
In 193) the W agstaii oil and gas operation had been 
restricted to lots 1·6, 16 and 17 of Block 16, whJCh they rented 
from the Bamberger interests (R. 52-53; Ex. L, 5). In con-
nection with their business they wished to construct an over-
ground pipeline from a spur adjacent to Oak Street to the 
land in the rear of lots 16 and 17 in order that they might 
can for resale oil received in bulk (R. 30-3 L 54). With per· 
mission of the Bamberger interests (R. 28), a 3-inch pipeline, 
placed on pedestals, was constructed; it ran from lot 1, Block 
17 to lot 2, Block 17, crossing lots 22-24 (R. 54-55). In the 
transition between the occupancy of the Hamberger intere~ts 
and that of the Wagstaffs, 55-gallon barrels and several trucks 
were placed on the premises (R. 55). 
From approximately 1936 to 1941 the subject realty was 
occupied in connection with the \\;'agstaff oil storage and 
trucking businesses (R. 55-58). Vessels of approximately 
2,000 gallons in ~ize were placed on lots 22-24 (R. 55·56). A 
Butler prefabricated building was placed on lots 24-25; it sat 
upon a cement foundation, and then contained the oil canning 
equipment. It remained until 1941 (R. 76-77). Four "quite 
lengthy"' heavy steel racks, of a height of four barrels, which 
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were set upon cement buttons and which required a large 
truck to move, were located upon the land in dispute (R 65). 
Other drums set on cement pins were present, allowing a total 
storage of approximately 50,000 gallons (R. 75). The property 
also accommodated several trucks, 45 to 60 feet long, and 
their spare trailer units (R. 56-57). The lots became heavily 
rutted; filling and leveling was necessitated (R. 54). The bulk 
storage use itself, when mo.ved, occupied-and still occupies-
lots 1 through 6, Block 17 (R. 58). The lots were over-
crowded (R. 57). 
From 1941 to 1947, due to wartime tribulations experi-
enced by oil and gas dealers, the subject realty was utilized as 
a war surplus salvage yard and for storage (R. 63-66). A 
'"tremendous amount" of salvage was placed upon it; the 
business was large enough that the tenants had to acquire lots 
34-38, Block 17, to accommodate the overflow (R. 64). Just 
enough room was left for the Wagstaff equipment to get 
through (R. 64). A baler, used in connection with the opera· 
tion, was located on the southerly portion of lots 24 and 25; 
it was 1 feet long, 80 feet wide, 9 to 10 feet tall (R. 65), and 
set upon cement buttons (R. 70). 
The years 1947 to 1950 constituted a transition period 
during which the property was occupied for both the salvage 
use and the one hereinafter described (R .. 12. 63). 
SubSe<juent to 1950 the realty was put to 1ts present use 
by Donald Wagstafi", who was the Bamberger interests" tenant 
following the death of his brother (R. 33). Mr. \'<;-'agstaff 
is the owner of lots 7-l'J, Block 16, lots 34-58. Block P, and 
property to the west of the Bamberger right-of-way (R. 4\ 
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51-52). He leases from the Bamberger interests, in addition 
to the realty in dispute, lots 1-6 of Block 16 and lots 1-9 and 
16-17 of Block 17 (R. 59) . .A motel owned by another occu-
pies lots 31-33 of Block 17. Mr. Wagstaff conducts rhe follow' 
ing enterprises: a truck stop which provides repair of vehicles 
together with a cafe (R. 59-60, 70); the rental of two trucks 
and the use of six more (R. 60); truck equipment construction 
and sales (R. 60); and an oil and gas business (R. 60-61). 
Three of the four activities make use of the property in dispute; 
it would be prohibitive to operate them without using it (R. 
61). In connection with the first line of bminess, Mr. Wagstaff 
licenses parking area to siA companies, Jive of which use the 
land, as well as lots 1-8 to the south of it and north of the 
Bamberger right-of-way (R. 59-60). They also provide parking 
for vehicles which are to undergo repair (R. 39). As few 
as 2-3 transports and as many as 35 use the facilities at a given 
time (R. 59). Mr. Wagstaff's advertising material indicates 
that ample parking facilities are available (R. 68). In con-
nection with the second line of business, the property is used 
as a base of operations for Mr. Wagstaff's eight-transport fleet, 
composed of Cummins Diesels and their trailers, l'iO feet in 
length, and of automobile transports 45 feet in length (R. 60). 
In connection with the third line of endeavor, the westerly 
portion of the lots to the south of Chestnut Street and to the 
east of the Bamberger right-of-way are used for storage of 
truck bodies, hoists and various items which attach to heavy 
equipment (R. 60-61). Some $30,000.00 worth of hoists are 
on lots 22 and 23 alone (R. 61). The subject realty is, on the 
average, crowded (R. 62). The use of Chestnut Street and 
the alleys has been approximately of equal intensity, save for 
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• 
that portion between Lot 17-28 of fllock 17 (R. 27, 71-72); 
no claim is here made for such property because, although 
they are not "open" in layman's language (R. 30) and although 
the Bamberger trucks now obstruct it (R. 26, 42), there has 
been a belief that title to a city street cannot be obtained until 
the street is formally vacated (R. 43). The Wagstaff operation 
is sufficiently extensive that "anyone can Look and see that 
you can't use it without receiving permission" (R. 40). It 
Lacks standing area let alone parking area (R. 63). Business 
invitees must have a ticket in order to lock their vehicles 
(R. 62). Lot attendants issue the tickets during the day; the 
service station manager does so at all times (R. 62). Wagstaff 
employees patrol the area to assure that no trespassers are 
present (R. 62). Mr. Wagstaff has had trespassers removed 
from the subject real estate by the police (R. 74). 
The Wagstaff brothers or Donald Wagstaff have had tbe 
realty surfaced at least three times (R. 67). The heavily-rutted 
land was filled and leveled, and a pocket filled with a road 
base (R. 67). Some two hundred tons of fill was used (R. 69). 
On two subsequent occasions the area, including the disputed 
property, was covered with chips and oil, necessitated because 
diesel fuel dissolves blacktop (R. 69). The resulting surface 
protects the business invitees from becoming mired (R. 69). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The form of the findings of fact is proper. 
2. Appellants' tax title is invalid; hence it does not defeat 
respondents' record title. 
10 
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3. Appellants' interest, if any, has been terminated, and 
does not defeat respondents' record title. 
4. Respondents have title by adverse possesswn. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE FORM OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT IS PROPER. 
Appellants' complaint relative to the findings of fact is 
ill-founded. A trial court is not required to recite evidentiary 
facts. A finding of ultimate facts suffices. This is true under 
Rule 52 (a), 5 Moore'J Federal Practice 2660"61. It was true 
under the old code. Fulla tJ. Burnett, 66 Utah 507, 243 Pac. 
790 ( 1926). 
The bnding of legal title as opposed to tax title, a dis· 
tinction recogni~ed by 78-12-7.1 LJ.C.A. 195:;, is based upon 
a recitation of the outline of such title (R. 90-91), and is suf-
ficent; there was no necessity for the trial court to describe 
the chain of title deed by deed. 
That the attack upon findings 5 and 6, which together 
with finding 7 deal with adverse possession, is erroneous is 
obvious from a readmg of Dignan r. Nelson, 26 Utah 186, 
72 Pac. 936 (1903), decided under the relatively more restric-
tive former Code of Civil Procedure. The appellants there 
attacked as indefinite and uncertain findings that were almost 
identical to (and, if anything, less specific than) those in the 
instant case: 
11 
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• 
That for more than seven years last past, to:wit, for 
twenty years, and ever since the death of said John A. 
Nelson, the said Eliza Nelson and Lila S. Nelson, in 
person and by their tenants, have been in the open, 
notorious, and exclusive adverse possession of all of 
said lots, and have paid all the taxes thereon, adversely 
to said plaintiffs and each of them, and without privity 
of estate in any manner with them. 
The Court rejected the appellants' position, stating at 72 
Pac. 938: 
It is obviou:; that in these findings the ultimate facts 
sufficiently appear, and they show an open, notorious, 
adverse possession of all the lots since the year 1880, 
a period of time longer than that required by the statute. 
They also show payment of all the taxes levied against 
the property, and, according to the findings, the posses· 
sian of the defendants was an "'exclusive adverse 
possession" of all the lots, and consequently the plain-
tiffs must have been ousted. 
It will be noted that no mention is made of "'ordinary Lise" 
and, therefore, the instant finding to that eHect was not a 
technical requirement. 
Although the findings are thus proper, even if they were 
inartistic or technically improper. appellants are misadvised 
as to the effect of impropriety when they imply that reversal 
of the judgment is necessary. At worst, the findings must be 
returned to the trial judge for the preparation of new findings; 
even this is not necessary where the complainant does not 
show prejudice, or where a full appellate understanding of 
the questions presented may be had, as here, from a reading 
of the findings, the pleadings, the pre-trial order and the 
record. 5 Moore's Federal Practice 2662-64; Jvlarquis 1. hdm1d. 
12 
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86 Kan. 416, 121 Pac. 486 (1912). The foregoing rules apply 
even \\·here there are no findings at all. 
II. 
APPELLANTS" TAX TITLE IS INVALID; HENCE IT 
DOES l\OT DEFEAT RESPONDENTS" RECORD'TITLE. 
In recognition of the apparent illegality of the tax title 
upon \\hich they rely (R. 4; Ex. 1, pp. 11, 24; h. 8), appellants 
have not sought to uphold it affirmatively. Instead, they have 
argued, by way of confession and avoidanc:e in Point V of their 
brief that "respondents must recover on the strength of their 
own tJtle."" Respondents, of course, do not (juarrel with the 
legal principle involved; it is ;o well settled as to require 
no citation. They point out, however, that a record owner 
may quiet title by demonstrating the invalidity of clouds of 
record, including tax titles, thereon. Valley Inv. Co. r. Los 
Angeler & Salt Lake R. Co., 119 Utah 169, 225 P. 2d 720 
(1950). Tills, too, is so well settled that it requires no citation. 
Respondents launched an attack upon appeJiants" tax 
title before the trial court (R. 78, 80·85). Appellants, who, 
unlike respondents, had an opportunity to do so, did not plead 
the provisions of 78-12-5.1, 78-12-5.2, 78-12-7.1 or 78-12-12.1 
U.C.A. 1953. Their relative applicability need not, therefore, 
be analyzed, and the validity of appellants" tax title is properly 
at issue. Hansen v. Morril', 3 Utah 2d 310, 283 P. 2d 884,886 
(1944). 
The validity of appellant~· daimed title is to be judged. 
by the rule announced in Olsen 11. Bagley, 10 Utah 497, 37 
ll 
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Pac. 739 (i894) and later affirmed in Eastman t-', Gurrey, 15 
Utah 410, 49 Pac. 310 (1897): 
Tax sales are made exclusively under statutory power, 
and, unless all the necessary prerequisites of the statute 
are carried out, the tax sale becomes invalid. If one of 
the prerequisites fail, it is as fatal as if all failed. The 
power vested in a public officer to sell land for the 
nonpayment of taxes is a naked power, not coupled 
with an interest, and every prerequisite to the exercise 
of the power must precede its exercise. The title to be 
acquired under statutes authorizing the sale of land 
for nonpayment of taxes is regarded as stricti juris, 
and whoever sets up a tax title must show that all the 
n:quirements of the law have been complied with (37 
Pac. at 740). 
An enumeration of the prerequisites applicable to appel-
lants' tax title are contained in the Revenue Act of 1896 
(Chapter 124, Laws of Utah, 1896). Its mandates, and the 
lack of compliance therewith, are recited hereinunder: 
( 1) There was no compliance with the requirement of 
Sections 20-21, 43, and 117 that if the name of the owner 
is ascertainable he should be listed on the assessment roll 
and the delinquent list, and that if not ascertainable he should 
be listed as "unknown," county records to be consulted rela-
tive to such ownership. Although the public records indicated 
that the property in question was owned by W. H. Folsom 
and Hyrum P. Folsom, as tenants in common (Ex. 1, p. 5), 
both the assessment roll and the delinquent list reflected 
the ownership as being in "W. H. Folsom et a!." (R. 8'>; 
Ex. 9). This defect is fatal under A.rper 1·. Moon. 24 Utab 
241, 67 Pac. 409 ( 1902), which involved the tax s.ale purchase 
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by appellant'; predecessor of lots in folsom's Addition to 
Salt Lake City which were listed as owned by "W. H. Folsom 
et al." In Jungk v. Snyder, 28 Utah 1, 78 Pac. 168 (1904), 
involving an lfl96 assessment, a fatal deviation from Sections 
21 and 43 was found when, although the county records re-
vealed the name of the owner, both the assessment roll and 
the delinquent list de:.cribed the owner a~ "unknown." 
(2) Here, as in AJpef 1.1. Moon, JUpra, the property was 
listed in the assessment rolls and dellnquent list as in "folsom"s 
Add.,"" not "'folsom's Addition to Salt Lake City" (R. 82; 
Ex. 9). The plat had been filed (Ex. 1, p. 9). This consti· 
tuted a fatal departure from the requirements of Sections 43 
and 117. 
( 3) The post oft ice address of the owners was neither 
listed as required by Section 13 and as necessary for com-
pliance with the ."notice sections,"" 46 and 106, nor negatived 
(R. 83). 
( 4) Although both Sections 43 and 117 require that each 
block be listed separately, and although Section 117 requires 
that only sufficient of the property shall be exposed to pay 
the taxes and costs, blocks were grouped together in the 
assessment rolls, the delinquent list, the record of sale and 
the auditor's deed (R. 82; Ex. 1, p. 11; Ex. 8, 9). This, also, 
constituted a fatal defect. Wall t". Kaighn, 4) Utah 244, 144 
Pac. 1100, 1103 (1914). 
(5) The auditor's c:ertificate required by Section 101 was 
not present in rbe book which contained the record of the 
assessment in question (R. 81). In Book D, where the form 
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• 
was in evidence, it was neither subscribed nor sworn to (R. 
8 t). The assessment rolls are, therefore, inadequate to sustain 
the validity of the assessment or of the consequent sale and 
deed. Telonis v. Stalq, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2d 513 (1943); 
"Equitable Life & Casualty Im. Co. v. Schoewe, 105 Utah 569, 
144 P. 2d 526 (1943); Tree v. White, 110 Utah 233, 17l 
P. 2d 398 (1946); Petterson r·. Ogden City, lll Utah 125, 
176 P. 2d 526 (1947); Jenkins~-. Morgan, 113 Utah 534, 196 
P. 2d 871 (1948); Sperry v. Tolley, 114 Utah 303, 199 P. 2d 
542 (1948); Valleylnv. Co. v. Los Angeles & Salt LakeR. Co., 
.rupra; Pender r.Jackson, 123 Utah 501, 26o P. 2d 512 (1953). 
Inasmuch as appellants' tax deed, the sole cloud upon 
respondents' record title, is void for illegality, the trial court 
was correct in quieting respondents' title. 
III. 
APPELLANTS' INTEREST, IF ANY, HAS BEEN TER-
MINATED, AND DOES NOT DEFEAT RESPONDENTS' 
RECORD TITLE. 
On January 3, 1898, the real estate in controversy was 
struck off to Salt Lake County for delinquent taxes for the 
year 1897 (Ex. 1, p. 18). Previously it had been sold toM. C 
Moon, appellants' predecessor, for delinquent taxes for the 
year 1896 (Ex. 1, p. 11). Subsequently, pursuant to R. S. 
1898, § 2623, the amount of delinquent taxes for 1898 was 
credited to the County (Ex. 1, p. 18). Thereafter, the interest 
of the County was transferred by an instrument now over 
thirty years of age (see, as to the recitations therein, Rule 63 
(19}. "Preliminary Draft of the Rules of Evidence," 27 Utah 
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Bar Bulletin, 41·42 (1957}; il!cCormick on Evident:e § 298; 
78-25-3 is also in point) to respondents' predecessor, also the 
legal title holder (Ex. I, p. 76). 
Assuming the validity of the assessment and sale to Mrs. 
Moon, her interest was terminated by the unredeemed sale 
to the County for later taxes. This being so, her later tax deed 
was unauthorized and a nullity. It does not, therefore, con-
stitute a cloud on respondents' record title. 
Although no Utah case in point has been found, re-
spondents' position that a tax sale cuts off all prior tax liens, 
is upheld, in the absence of peculiar local enactment, by other 
American jurisdictions. See, in this connection 37 Cyc. 1177; 
26 R.C.L, Taxation, § 361; 61 C.J.. taxation, 1838; 46 Cal. 
Jur. 2d, Taxation,§ 236; 51 Am. Jur., Taxation,§ 1080; 85 
C.J-S .. Taxation,§ 908; Ann. Cas. 1917 A. 675. 
The decisions Ill support of respondents' position arc nu-
merous and a rev1ew of all, or even a substantial part, of them 
is impossible. Two are illustrative. 
In Anderson r. Ryder_. 46 Cal. 135 (1873), R., who held 
a Sheriff's Deed issued as a result of an 1867 tax delinquency, 
brought an ejectment action against A., who held a like deed 
issued as a result of an 1866 taX" delinquency on the realty 
there in question. The California Supreme Court, in affirming 
judgment for plaintiff, stated, at page 138: 
The defendant also relied upon an outstanding title 
as a defense to the action. But this title was derived 
through a sale of delinquent taxes for the year of 1866, 
whilst the plaintiff's title is founded on a sale for taxes 
for the year 1867. In such cases it is clear that the title 
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acquired under a tax sale for taxes of a subsequent 
year must prevail over a title founded on a sale for the 
taxes of a previous year. It was incumbent on the pur-
chaser at the sale for the taxes of 1866 to see that the 
taxes of 1867 were paid; and his title is unavailing, as 
against a title acquired through a sale for the taxes for 
the latter year. 
Hubbafd 1. Hammerstrom. 231 Iowa 1316, 4 N.W. 2d 
658 ( 1942), demonstrates that the ta.'l: deed to appellants was 
unauthorized, hence a nullity. The plaintiff, the assignee of 
tax certificates purchased at a sale for the nonpayment of taxes 
for 1931-33, brought a mandamus action against the Woodbury 
County Treasurer to compel issuance to plaintiff of a tax deed. 
The defendant responded that a deed to the real property 
there in controversy had been issued previously to the holder 
of tax sale certificates for the years 1931-36. The trial court 
ruled for the defendant. On appeal the Supreme Court of Iowa 
affirmed, stating at 4 N.W. 2d 659-60: 
Keither he {the buyer], nor anyone else, paid the 
taxes for any of the years subsequent to the issuance of 
his tax certificates. Because of such failure, it was the 
duty of the county treasurer to again sell the property 
at tax sale. The properties were bid in for the delin-
quent taxes, and the certificates of such sales became 
the property of Lohr, who thereafter fully complied 
with the statutory provisions with respect to redemption 
so that it was the duty of the county treasurer to issue 
tax deeds to him_ \'(·'oodbury Council had then no 
present right in the properties because of delinquent 
taxes against them. 1-ly issuing the tax deeds to Lohr, 
the county and its county treasurer had exhausted any 
existing right in the latter to execute other tax deeds 
to the property. The defendant, therefore, rightly re-
18 
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jected the plaintiff's tender and demand, and the trial 
coutt rightly denied the writ of mandamus. 
The authority cited by appellants does not controvert, 
but rather supplies verification, of respondents' contention. 
')edgwick County Comm'n. v Conners, 121 Kan. 10'5, 245 Pac. 
1030 (1926) rested entirely, although appellants' brief does 
not so note, upon a statutory modification of the principle of 
law heretofore discussed. This was stressed by the Kansas 
Supreme Court in its Syllabus 1: "Where real property has 
been sold for delinquent taxes and bid in for the county by 
the treasurer, further sales of the property for unpaid taxes 
in subsequent years are fMbidden by statute until the property 
is redeemed (or otherwise disposed of by procedure not here 
pertinent ... ) " (Emphasis supplied). The statute in question, 
R. S. 79-2319, dealt only with the circumstance in which, for 
lack of individual purchaser, the ta~Hielinquent realty had 
been struck off lo the County. 
The legislative distinction between an individual as prior 
certificate holder and the county as prior certificate holder is 
apparent and founded on good sense. Taxes sustain govern-
mental functions. Were the county to bid in the property for 
one year, have the taxes for subsequent years added, then sell 
off its interest for the later years thus terminating the liability 
for the former, it would be short-changed. ln order that it 
may receive its full quota of taxes, however, it has a right to 
require that the prior individual certificate holder redeem 
subsequent taxes; if this requirement is not met, it may sell 
its interest to gain its rightful revenue. 
~uch a distinction was recognized m the Utah Revenue 
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Act of 1896, supra. Section 1 thereof provided that all property 
within Utah, not exempt by the laws of the United States or 
the Constitution of Utah, would be taxed. Sections 2 and 3 
set forth certain exemptions; tbey did not indude as exempt 
property jof U'bich a certificate of tax _,,J!e U'as out.ltanding. 
Section 120 provided: 
if at any tax sales no person shall bid and pay 
the treasurer the amount of taxes required to be pa.id 
as aforesaid on any real estate, the treasurer shall make 
to the county a certificate similar to that given to 
other purchasers, and such sale to the county shall have 
the same effect as if made to an individual, and the 
county auditor shall credit the treasurer with the 
amount of the tax due thereon and costs to date of sale; 
Provided, That if the property purchased in the name 
of the county shall not be redeemed before the issu-
ance of a tax deed, the treasurer shall not proceed to 
sell the same, and the county auditor shall credit the 
treasurer with the amount of the tax due thereon, but 
in any case the party redeeming shall pay all taxes that 
may be assessed and costs that may accrue upon land 
subsequent to the sale. 
Sections 146-47, cited by appellants as applicable to the status 
of their predecessor, an individual certificate holder, regard 
only those situations in which the property is struck off to the 
County. Appellant did not make mention of Section 148, whid1 
stresses the distinction: 
In case property is sold to the county as purchaser, 
pursuant to Section 120 of this act, and is subsequently 
assessed pursuant to section 145 of this act, no person 
must be permitted to redeem from such sale, except 
upon payment also of the amount of such subsequent 
assessment, fees and interest. 
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The foregoing provisions apply only to subsequent taxes 
in those cases in which the county is the prior certificate holder. 
There was, in the Rerenue Act of 1896, no such modification 
relative to priOf individual certificate holders of the rule that 
subsequent tax sale:, cut off prior ones. Such prior individual 
certificate holders were, of course, persons interested in the 
property, and could, pursuant to Section 121 and within four 
years, redeem it from the subsequent sales. It is quite another 
thing to suggest, as do appellants, that such prior purchaser 
had a lien (Section 92 provided that the lien was the County's, 
extinguished upon sale) and they "foreclosed" the "lien" when 
they took then purported deed (V>·here is the "foreclosure" 
under Section 123 which provides for a purely ministerial 
delivery of deed): to Sa)', in fact, that their predecessOf was 
so far above the law that she could wait foret•er /o take the 
deed, allow taxes, unpaid b)' her or anyone else, to accumulate 
and, meanwhile, keep the county from recovering these sub. 
sequent taxes (for no purchaser would buy ffom the cuunty 
if its title wa.r absolutely dependent upon the inclination of 
M. C . .Moon). If what appellants claim is correct, an individual 
tax certificate holder can allow subsequent taxes to accumulate, 
then thwart their validity through presentation of certificate 
and receipt of deed. Such should not, by reason, be the laV>·. It 
is not the Jaw, under either decision or statute. 
Appellants' Point IV may be disposed of at this point. 
They cite no cases to the effect that the subsequent tax purchaser 
is a cotenant of the prior tax purchaser. Respondents' research 
reveals none. In point of law, the authorities previously cited 
hold that, unless there is statutory enactment to the contrary 
(and re5pondent knows of none establishing a cotenancy) a 
21 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
subseguent tax sale cuts off a prior one when the taxes arc 
imposed by the same authority. 
Appellants complam, finally, that the deed to respondents" 
predecessor (Ex. 2) does not conform to Settion 123 of rhe 
Revenue Ad of 1896. Even if true, this is beside the point. 
Respondents' title does not originate in such deed. W'hatever 
title respondent obtained from the County was merged thereby 
in its record legal title which runs back to the original patent. 
Because the subseguent tax sale cut off the prior tax lien, snch 
lien could not culminate in a valid deed and neither the lien 
nor the deed constitute a cloud on respondents' record title. 
Were the validity of the deed to respondents' predecessor 
at i~~ue, title nevertheless should be quicted. Appellants, 
for the first time, attack the validity of respondents" title, by 
virtue of the tax sales of 1898 and 1899 in Point III of their 
brief. Unlike appellants, therefore, this is the fust opportunity 
which respondents have had to raise the provisions of 78-12·5.1, 
78"12-5.2, 78-12·7.1 and 78-12-12.1 U.C.A. 1955; therefore, 
they are now so raised. See Hansn1 1". ,\!orriJ, wpra. 
This aside, the reason the deed to respondents' predecessor 
does not conform to Section l23 i; simple: it does not purport 
to do so. It is a qUitclaim deed, issued by the clerk under 
authority of Section 2655 of the Revised Statutes of Utah. 
1898, as amended by the Session Laws of 1905, \\hich pro· 
vided a means by which the County might sell property str(l(k 
off to it and not redeemed by persons with an interest in it. 
The transfer to Governor Bamberger was dearly a sale, inas· 
much as a quitclaim deed, not an auditor's deed, was issued. 
Under authorities pr<"viously cited, the recited compliance with 
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the statutory mandates constitutes a recital in an ancient deed 
which constitutes prima facie proof of regularity. And that 
proof has not been rebutted. 
If, therefore, M. C. Moon gained any interest in Lots 
22-27 through her purchase of them for 1896 taxes, her 
interest was cut off by the failure to redeem from sales occa-
sioned by the tax delinquencies of 1897 and 1898 taxes, and 
the unauthorized deed emanating therefrom does not cloud 
either respondents' tax title or their record title. 
IV. 
RESPONDENTS HAVE TITLE BY ADVERSE POS-
SESSION. 
Even if it is assumed that appellants' tax title was valid 
and despite respondents' "May sale" deed presently subsists, 
appellants must fail: the record estabhshes beyond doubt that 
respondents, in the assumed event, have title by adverse pos-
session. Appellants concede that respondents and their prede-
cessors have paid taxes for the period of time made requisite 
by 78-12-12 U.C.A. 1953 and 78-12-12.1 U.C.A. 1953 (Appel-
lants' Brief, p. 3). There can be no doubt that respondents and 
their predecessors hold, and have held, title under a written 
instrument (Ex. 1, pp. 19, 20, 26, 27; Ex. 2). The sole question 
of law, therefore, is whether the cviden~e adduced by respond-
ents at the trial is sufficient to establish that its possessory 
activities satisfy the requirements of 78-12-9 U.C.A. 1953 
for a period of time established by 78-12-12 U.C.A. 19'53 as 
to its legal title or, as to its tax title 78-12-12_1 U.CA. 1953. 
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• 
As here pertinent, 78-12-9 provides: 
For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession 
by any person claiming a title founded upon a written 
instrument ... land is deemed to have been possessed 
and occupied in the following cases: 
( 1) "Where it has been usually ... improved; 
• 
' 
• 
( 2) Where, although not inclosed, it has been used 
... for the ordinary usc of the occupant. * * ~ 
The two clauses will be considered in reverse order. 
It was indicated by the Supreme Couxt of California in 
Posey v. Bay Point Realty Co., 214 Cal. 708, 7 P. 2d 1020, 
1022 (1932), a case in which occasional use of swampland 
was held to be "for the ordinary use of the occupant:" 
'This is the plain meaning of the clause "for the 
ordinary use of the occupant;" it means a use appro-
priate to the locatiOn and character of the property, 
each case resting upon its own peculiar facts. 
The facts of this case demonstrate amp!J that the occupancy 
of the land in question has been "for the ordinary 'use of the 
occupant;" in fact it has been of such intensity that, in a true 
sense, respondents and their predecessors have fulfilled the 
requirement that a disseisor "must unfurl his flag 011 the 
land, and keep it flying, so that the owner may see, if he will, 
that an enemy has invaded his domains and planted the standard 
of conquest," CurtiJ 1·. La Grande W aU1r Co .. 20 Or. 34, 23 Pac. 
808 ( 1890). One has only to read the record, properly reflected 
in respondents' unabbreviated statement of facts, to recognize 
that the use to whKh the land here in dispute has been put 
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was open, notorious, hostile, adverse, continuous and exclusive 
as to all persons, including appellants, and for the ordinary 
use of the occupant. 
Despite the existence of these facts, appellants state: 
(1) As to the use by the Bamberger interests (1917-
1935): 
(a) Bamberger Electric Railroad was a stranger to 
the title. 
(b) Da)' v. Steele, 111 Utah 224, 184 P. 2d 224 
(1917) establishes as a matter of law that main-
tenance of a railroad tie yard by a railroad IS 
not "for the ordinary use of the occupant;" 
(c) Other land belonging to respondents' predecessor 
was used for the same purpose. 
(2) As to the usc by the Wagstaffs (1935-present): 
(a) The placement of oil storage drums and salvage 
material was temporary; 
(b) The parking area is for transients; 
(c) Both (a) and (b) may be considered a mere 
"overflow" within the meaning of Peery Ertate 
v. Ford, 46 Utah 346, 151 Pac. 59 (1915). 
Appellants' objections are devoid of support, either in the 
evidence or in the applicable lav... 
(1) As to the use by the Bamberger interests: 
(a) Bamberger Electric Railroad Corrlpany, one of 
the Bamberger interests, occupied the property 
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with the permission of, and in subordination to, 
Simon and Ida M. Bamberger and, later, the 
Simon Bamberger Company (R. 23-25). Its 
occupancy was theirs, 1 Am. Jur., Adverse Pos. 
session §LS3; 5 Thompson on Real Property 
(1957 Replacement Volume) § 2551 at 566-67. 
(b) Day I'. Steele, which dealt with occasional usage 
'"not of unequivocal character indicating a claim 
of ownership," (184 P. 2d at 216) did not pur-
port to overrule Bingham Livery & Tramfer Co. 
I". McDonald, 37 Utah 457, 110 Pac. 56 (1910) 
in which a blacksmith was held to be an adverse 
possessor when, continuously, he used the un-
enclosed land there in dispute, adjacent to his 
business, for storage and repair work. Nor is 
Day inconsistent with Holtzman v. Douglas, 
168 U.S. 278, 18 S. Ct. 65,42 L. Ed. 466 (1897) 
in which the Supreme Court of the United States 
sustained a claim of adverse possession where 
the claimanfs tenant, a stone-cutter and builder, 
continuously utilized the unenclosed premises 
there in controversy as a stoneyard and for star· 
age of pontoons. It is submitted by respondent£ 
that the use by a railroad of unenclosed rural 
land (R. 21), adjacent to a railroad, as a rail· 
road tie yard, is, within the meaning of 7B-12·9 
U.C.A. 1953, "for the ordinary use of the occu· 
pant." 
(c) The fact that adjoining land belonging to the 
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Bamberger mterests was occupied as a part of 
the same tie yard strengthens, not weakens, the 
character of the user, in view of the fact that the 
test of whether an occupancy constitutes adverse 
possession is whether it exhibits "the actual 
degree of control ordinarily exercised over such 
property by the average owner of it." 3 American 
Law of Property §15.3. 
(2) As to the usc by the Wagstaffs: 
(a) The storage of 2,000 gallon oil drums (R. 55-
56) and salvage certainly was not transitory. 
The former, coupled with the erection of heavy 
steel racks of considerable size (R. 65), the 
erection of a Butler prefabricated building placed 
upon a cement foundation (R. 76-77) and the 
accommodation of several 46 to 60 foot long 
trucks and their spare trailer units (R. 56-57), 
lasted 5 years, from 1936 to 19-11 (R. 55-58). 
The storage of salvage, coupled with the erec-
tion of a baler of considerable size (R. 65, 70), 
occupied 6 years, 1?41 to 1?47 (R. 63-66). 
(b) It mu~t be admitted that the trucks with licenses 
to park on the area (R. 59-60), vehicles waiting 
to undergo repair (R. 39), Mr. Wagstaff's own 
fleet (R. 60), truck accessory equipment await-
ing construction and/or sale (R. 60-61) arc 
transient in the sense that they will not remain 
through eternity. It should be remembered, ho'l'.·-
ever. that Mr. WagstafL not the vehicles and 
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equipment, is the occupant and that the intensity 
of use, not the invariability of the particular 
physical objects present, is the test. The use !S 
particularly heavy. The area lacks standing 
space let alone parking space (R. 63). "Anyone 
can look and see that you can't use it without 
receiving permission-' (R. 40). 
(c) Would the record permit designation of the 
Wagstaff usc as an "overflow" the Pem-y case 
might apply (the word "might" is used advis-
edly; Peety dealt with a very small strip of land 
which one neighbor wished to take from another 
through the type of use that constituted him a 
bad neighbor, but did not advertise an adverse 
possession). There is, however, nothing in the 
record consistent with the "overflow'' hypothesis. 
The record, in fact, is to the contrary. The m-
tensity of user of the present parking facilities 
has been stressed. As to the oil business: "We 
were always crowding the alley and we wert 
crowding the tracks" (R. 57). As to the salvage 
business: ''Those lots were filled . . that i1 
what precipitated the buying of . . . [more J 
land" (R. 64). It is submitted that the use of 
industrial land (R. 22. 62) by an oil canner and 
trucker as an oil cannery and truck storage area, 
by a salvage dealer as a salvage yard and by a 
repairman, parking lot operator and automobile 
accessory builder and seller as a waiting area, 
a parking lot and a construction and display 
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yard is, within the meaning of 78·12·9 U.CA. 
1953, "for the ordinary use of the occupant." 
In addition to the foregoing, the lots in controversy have 
been improved by the W agstaffs. The test for satisfactory 
improvement is laid down in Day v. Steele, supra, at 184 P. 
2d 219: improvement "in the manner usual to improve that 
kind and character of land for the uses to which it could be 
put." This land, situate in an industrial area·, and surrounded 
by various Wagstaff activities (R. 45, 51·52, 59) each of 
which require a parking area (R. 59·61, 68), has been leveled, 
had 200 tons of fill added to it and covered twice with chips 
and oil-it has, in short, been transformed into a suitable plot 
for parking (R. 69). Such improvement, under the Day test, 
is sufficient to meet the requirement of 78-12-9 U.C.A. 1953. 
The facts make out at least 41 years adverse possession 
of the realty in dispute. The trial court correctly quieted title. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court" s findings and decree accorded with the 
evidence and the applicable law. The judgment should b<~ 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ke11t Shearer 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City 1, Ctah 
AttorneyJ for Respondents 
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